Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 9, Page 1001-1002, November 2022.

In his absorbing book Art as Performance, David Davies argues that artworks should be identified, not with artistic products such as paintings or novels, but instead with the artistic actions or processes that produced such items. Such a view had an earlier incarnation in Currie’s widely criticized “action type hypothesis”, but Davies argues that it is instead action tokens rather than types with which artworks should be identified. This rich and complex work repays the closest study in spite of (...) some basic objections to be raised concerning Davies’s central concept of an action token. (shrink)

If we are to understand the concept of toleration in terms of everyday life, we must address a key philosophical and political tension: the call for restraint when encountering apparently wrong beliefs and actions versus the good reasons for interfering with the lives of the subjects of these beliefs and actions. This collection contains original contributions to the ongoing debate on the nature of toleration, including its definition, historical development, justification, and limits. In exploring the issues surrounding toleration, the essays (...) address a variety of provocative questions. Is toleration a moral virtue of individuals or rather a pragmatic political compromise? Is it an intrinsically good principle or only a "second best-solution" to the dangers of fanaticism to be superseded one day by the full acceptance of others? Does the value of toleration lie in respect to individuals and their autonomy, or rather in the recognition of the right of minority groups to maintain their communal identity? Throughout, the contributors point to the inherent indeterminacy of the concept and to the difficulty in locating it between intolerant absolutism and skeptical pluralism. Religion, sex, speech, and education are major areas requiring toleration in liberal societies. By applying theoretical analysis, these essays show the differences in the argument for toleration and its scope in each of these realms. The contributors include Joshua Cohen, George Fletcher, Gordon Graham, Alon Harel, Moshe Halbertal, Barbara Herman, John Horton, Will Kymlicka, Avishai Margalit, David Richards, Thomas Scanlon, and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Unprecedented advances in medicine, genetic engineering, and demographic forecasting raise new questions that strain the categories and assumptions of traditional ethical theories. Heyd's approach resolves many paradoxes in intergenerational justice, while offering a major test case for the profound problems of the limits of ethics and the nature of value. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, (...) and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1992. (shrink)

Beyond the well‐known ethical issues involved in medical experimentation on human subjects, experimenting with embryos raises unique and particularly hard problems. Beside the psychological obstacles connected with the fear of ‘‘playing God" and the awe with which we hold the process of the creation of human beings, there are three philosophical problems which are the main subject of the article:1. The logical problem of circularity: the morality of experimenting on embryos is dependent on the status of the embryo, which in (...) turn is partly decided by experimentation.2. The metaphysical problem: experiments are justified by the benefits they bring to human subjects; but it is doubtful whether an early embryo is a ‘‘subject" and whether coming into being is a ‘‘benefit".3. The moral problem: the standard constraint on medical experiments is that they benefit either the individual subject or at least members of a relevantly defined group of patients suffering from the same syndrome. But embryo experimentation is often associated with potential cure to people of a completely different category.Finally, the article discusses the limits of the force of philosophical arguments in the formation of actual policies for regulating such practices as experimenting with embryos. The widely‐shared fourteen‐day limit is shown to be a sound practical compromise despite the difficulties in justifying it philosophically. (shrink)

The Non-Identity Problem (NIP) has been recognized as a hindrance in justifying compensation for historical injustice. Since NIP applies to individuals, an attractive way of trying to remove the obstacle is by shifting the focus from the allegedly harmed individuals to the harmed group. However, critical examination of this move shows that (a) there are groups—most conspicuously African Americans—who were _created_ by the unjust wrongs for which compensation is now claimed and hence fall under the same category as any wrongful (...) life case on the individual level, and (b) even when the group already existed when the wrongs were perpetrated, with the long passage of time it changed its identity in the narrative sense, which means that its contemporary members are attached to it as it is defined today but not as it was when the wrong was done. The paper suggests, therefore, that the Group Non-Identity Problem (GNIP) is the parallel impediment to that of NIP in doing historical justice to social groups which were maltreated in the past. (shrink)

In his classical article, ‘Saints and Heroes’, James Urmson single-handedly revived the idea of supererogation from it astonishingly long post-Reformation slumber. During the first two decades after its publication, Urmson's challenge was taken up almost exclusively by either utilitarians or deontologists of some sort. On the face of it, neither classical utilitarianism nor Kant's categorical imperative makes room for action which is better than the maximizing requirement, on the one hand, or beyond the requirement of duty, on the other. Nevertheless, (...) both utilitarians and Kantians, as well as deontic logicians, offered more flexible and sophisticated versions of their respective theories which could accommodate supererogatory action. In my 1982 book on supererogation I tried to address the question whether virtue ethics could capture that new category of actions which are praiseworthy though not strictly required. But the focus of my discussion was mostly Aristotle and accordingly more interpretive in nature. However, that was just before the tremendous surge of interest in virtue ethics and the vast literature debating the merits of agent-based vs. action-based approaches in moral theory. It turned out that fitting supererogation into virtue-based moral theory proved to be a more difficult task than doing so in consequentialist and deontological theories. Some argued that supererogation could nevertheless be accounted for in aretaic terms; others held that it could not and that this fact attested to either a theoretical weakness – even if not a refutation – of virtue-based ethics, or to the incoherence of the concept of supererogation. (shrink)

'May one be pardon’ d and retain the offence?’ asks King Claudius in his tormented monologue in Hamlet. Forgiveness appears incompatible with the retention of the offence, both in the sense of enjoying its consequences and in the sense of the subsistence of the attitude which underlay the offensive act. There are, however, views which allow for, even admire, an attitude of forgiveness towards people who have ‘retained’ their offense in some way. This idea of forgiveness is harder to justify, (...) since no change has taken place in the agent. We suggest that the concept of toleration can serve as an illuminating clue in such an analysis. The tolerant attitude involves a certain kind of reconciliation with people who not only have done something wrong in the past, but insist on sticking to their objectionable conduct in the present and the future. Tolerance, in other words, is not conditioned by repentance or by commitment to behavioral transformation; it is a kind of unconditional ‘forgiveness’ in advance. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of the justification of experimenting on human subjects from the point of view of the individual participant. The discussion is conducted on three levels, which can be viewed as a hierarchy:I. Rationality: does one have good self-regarding reasons to subject oneself to medical experimentation?II. Justice: does one have a duty or an obligation to take part in medical research?III. Virtue: ought one contribute to the long-term attempt to promote medical knowledge and the overall health of (...) human beings?Rationality is shown to have only a limited force in such a justification, since many experiments cannot be shown to serve the interests of the participant in any way. Justice fares slightly better, since it is based on the idea of a social contract which goes beyond individual prudence. But, since many medical experiments promote the health only of future generations, the condition of mutuality, which is one of the bases of a social contract, is not satisfied. Thus, the ultimate reason to take part in medical research is associated with the supererogatory volunteering of people, who are motivated by the wish to contribute to a highly valuable enterprise with no expectation of return.The three types of reasons are complementary rather than exclusive, and the potential failure of all of them may lead to the undesirable commercialization of the field. Der Beitrag untersucht die Frage, ob und wie medizinische Versuche an Menschen aus der Sicht des einzelnen Teilnehmers gerechtfertigt werden können. Die Diskussion dieser Frage wird auf drei Ebenen geführt, die sich in einem Stufenverhältnis darstellen lassen,I. der Ebene der Zweckrationalität: Gibt es gute Gründe, und zwar durchaus des individuellen Eigennutzes, sich selbst für medizinische Versuche zur Verfügung zu stellen?II. der Ebene der Gerechtigkeit: Besteht eine Pflicht oder eine Verbindlichkeit zur Teilnahme an medizinischer Forschung?III. der Ebene der Tugend: Soll man zu dem auf lange Sicht angelegten Versuch beitragen, das medizinische Wissen und die Gesundheit der Menschen insgesamt zu fördern?Es wird gezeigt, daß das Argument der Zweckrationalität für eine mögliche Rechtfertigung nur von begrenzter Bedeutung ist. Denn viele Experimente dienen den Interessen des unmittelbaren Teilnehmers nachweislich in keiner Weise. Das Argument der Gerechtigkeit hat zwar eine etwas größere Kraft, weil Gerechtigkeit auf der Idee eines Gesellschaftsvertrags beruht, die über den Horizont individueller Klugheit hinausreicht. Da aber viele medizinische Experimente nur die Gesundheit zukünftiger Generationen fördern, ist die Bedingung der Gegenseitigkeit, die eine der Grundlagen des Gesellschaftsvertrags bildet, nicht erfüllt. Der dritte und letzte Grund für eine Teilnahme an medizinischer Forschung steht deshalb in enger Verbindung mit dem freiwilligen supererogatorischen Verhalten von Leuten, die durch den Wunsch motiviert sind, ohne Aussicht auf Gegenleistung zu einer höchst wertvollen Unternehmung etwas beizutragen.Die drei Arten von Gründen ergänzen sich mehr, als daß sie sich ausschließen. Ein mögliches Scheitern aller dieser Gründe könnte zu einer unerwünschten Kommerzialisierung der Teilnahme an medizinischen Experimenten führen. (shrink)

Some modern critics of Kant, like Bernard Williams, argue that his ideal of morality is a form of action which lies beyond any empirical determination. The aim of this article is to show that Kant was not only fully aware of the role of contingent elements in moral action, but that his fundamental conception of practical rationality is itself partly constituted by contingent factors. Practical rationality cannot be separated from its exercise and hence from the necessary empirical conditions of human (...) psychology and historical circumstances. Without a maxim there can be no manifestation of practical reason. Without a human character there is no room for moral virtue. Without achievement no moral action can be complete . Thus, human agency extends beyond the realm of pure motive. These themes reflecting Kant's recognition of the importance of contingency in his general theory of rational action are discussed primarily in the light of the Metaphysics of Morals, which in its structure and program explicitly sets out to tie together the a priori and contingent elements in a unified theory. Legality without morality is blind; morality without legality is vacuous. Einige moderne Kritiker Kants wie Bernard Williams behaupten, Kants Sittlichkeitsideal weise auf eine Handlungsform, die außerhalb alles empirisch Feststellbaren liege. Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es zu zeigen, daß Kant sich der Rolle kontingenter Elemente im moralischen Handeln nicht nur voll bewußt war, sondern daß sein grundlegender Entwurf praktischer Vernunft selbst teilweise auf kontingente Faktoren gegründet ist. Praktische Vernunft kann nicht von ihrer Anwendung getrennt werden und also auch nicht von den notwendig empirischen Bedingungen menschlicher Psychologie und von den historischen Umständen des Handelns. Ohne eine Maxime gibt es keine praktische Vernunft. Ohne einen menschlichen Charakter gibt es keine moralische Tugend. Ohne ein erreichtes Ziel kann keine moralische Handlung vollständig sein. Menschliches Handeln überschreitet die Grenzen des Bereichs bloßer Motive.Die Themen zeigen, daß Kant in seiner allgemeinen Theorie vernünftigen Handelns die Kontingenz ernst nimmt. Sie werden hauptsächlich im Lichte der Metaphysik der Sitten diskutiert, die sich in ihrem Programm und in ihrer Struktur explizit vornimmt, apriorische und kontingente Elemente in einer einheitlichen Theorie zu verbinden. Legalität ohne Moralität ist blind; Moralität ohne Legalität ist leer. (shrink)

I would strike you, were I not angry1Love and generosity are by their nature boundless, free from calculation. However, much of human interaction and particularly relations of justice are based on...

Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman's "Metametaphysics" anthology is reviewed.

Beyond the well‐known ethical issues involved in medical experimentation on human subjects, experimenting with embryos raises unique and particularly hard problems. Beside the psychological obstacles connected with the fear of ‘‘playing God" and the awe with which we hold the process of the creation of human beings, there are three philosophical problems which are the main subject of the article:1. The logical problem of circularity: the morality of experimenting on embryos is dependent on the status of the embryo, which in (...) turn is partly decided by experimentation.2. The metaphysical problem: experiments are justified by the benefits they bring to human subjects; but it is doubtful whether an early embryo is a ‘‘subject" and whether coming into being is a ‘‘benefit".3. The moral problem: the standard constraint on medical experiments is that they benefit either the individual subject or at least members of a relevantly defined group of patients suffering from the same syndrome. But embryo experimentation is often associated with potential cure to people of a completely different category .Finally, the article discusses the limits of the force of philosophical arguments in the formation of actual policies for regulating such practices as experimenting with embryos. The widely‐shared fourteen‐day limit is shown to be a sound practical compromise despite the difficulties in justifying it philosophically. (shrink)

The article examines the arguments for and against the practice of sex selection for non-medical reasons in the light of the new technology of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis . It distinguishes between arguments about the risks to the future child, the mother and society, on the one hand, and the inherent wrongness of the practice as an illegitimate interference in the natural course of reproduction, on the other. The article tries to show that at least in the well defined context of (...) sex selection by PGD, when IVF was performed for independent medical reasons, there is no danger to either the child or the mother and hence that the practice should be permitted. Furthermore, the alleged dangers to society are demonstrated to be mostly illusory. On the one hand, the demographic danger is usually overstated and lacks historical support.On the other hand, the feminist claim that sex selection is necessarily discriminatory is found to be both theoretically and empirically groundless. The article’s conclusion is that despite widespread intuitive objection to the practice of sex selection, it can be justified in terms of parental autonomy and falls within the value of family planning. This liberal view does not, however, imply that having a child of the desired sex is the parents’ right, nor does it apply to sex selection in later phases of gestation. (shrink)